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Remarks on Women Becoming Part
of the Constitution
The Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg*
We have a 200-year-old Constitution, the oldest written con-
stitution still in use, but only since 1971 have we had an evolving
jurisprudence of equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities
for women and men. The 1787 notion of "We the People," as Jus-
tice Marshall recently reminded us, was incomplete - indeed, it
left out the majority of the adult population: slaves, debtors, pau-
pers, Indians, and women. As framed in 1787, the Constitution
was a document of governance for and by white, propertied adult
males - a document for people who were free from dependence
on others and therefore not susceptible to influence or control by
masters, overlords, or superiors.1
With that original understanding in view, a too strict "juris-
prudence of the framers' original intent" seems to me unworkable,
and not what Madison or Hamilton would espouse were they with
us today. It cannot be, for example, that although the founding fa-
thers never dreamed of the likes of Dolly Madison or even the re-
doubtable Abigail Adams ever serving on a jury, we would today
say it is therefore necessary or proper to keep women off juries.
We still have, cherish, and live under our eighteenth century
Constitution because, through a combination of three factors or
forces - change in society's practices, constitutional amendment,
and judicial interpretation - a broadened system of participatory
democracy has evolved, one in which we take just pride. Women
are the numerically largest example. They did not figure as public
actors in the days when the Constitution and the post-Civil War
Amendments were originally conceived, but women are today un-
questionably part of "We the People." My assignment this morn-
ing is to summarize that chapter in constitutional history - when,
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, District of Co-
lumbia Circuit.
1. Richard B. Morris, Where Were the Women? 12 Columbia 40 (April 1987).
See generally Linda K. Kerber, "Ourselves and Our Daughters Forever" : Women
and the Constitution, 1787-1876, in this Constitution: A Bicentennial Chronicle 25
(Spring 1985) (published by Project '87 of the American Historical Association and
the American Political Science Association).
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why and how did women come to count in constitutional
adjudication.
Women's status under the law continued largely unaltered at
the Constitution's centennial 100 years ago. In 1887, women were
still thirty-three years away from securing the right to vote. And
the fourteenth amendment, added to the Constitution in 1868, de-
spite its grandly general, growth-susceptible equal protection
clause, did not inspire feminists of that day. Rather, the amend-
ment alarmed them; for its second section added to the Constitu-
tion for the very first time the word "male," and linked that word
to the word "citizens." 2 The suggestion seemed to be that, even if
women counted as citizens, as they did for some purposes, they
were (like children) something less than full citizens.3
If the post-Civil War Amendments did not immediately bear
on women's situation, was the critical date August 18, 1920, the
date on which the nineteenth amendment secured to women citi-
zens the right to vote? Not so, the Supreme Court informed us
more than a generation later in 1947 and 1948, and then again in
1961. In 1948, in Goesaert v. Cleary,4 the High Court said it was all
right for the State of Michigan to put the ladies Goesaert, a bar-
owning mother and daughter, out of business by legislating that
women could not tend bar except as wives and daughters of male
tavern owners. Justice Jackson explained the prevailing view
most cogently in Fay v. New York,5 a 1947 decision upholding
wholesale exemption of women from jury service. Justice Jackson
wrote:
The contention that women should be on the jury•. . is based
on a changing view of the rights and responsibilities of women
. .. which has progressed in all phases of [public] life .... but
has achieved constitutional compulsion on the states only in
the grant of the franchise by the Nineteenth Amendment.6
Except for the franchise, in other words, the Constitution re-
mained an empty cupboard for people seeking to promote the
equal status and stature of men and women under the law.
In 1961, in the same context - jury service - a unanimous
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. This section provides for reduction in the
number of Representatives when the state denies "male citizens" the right to vote.
The intent was to assure grant of the franchise to black men. See Eleanor Flexner,
Century of Struggle 146-150 (rev. ed. 1975).
3. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (women qualify as
persons and citizens within the fourteenth amendment's compass, so too do chil-
dren; but status as a person and citizen does not carry with it the right to vote).
4. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
5. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
6. Id. at 290.
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Warren Court reaffirmed the 1947 stand pat position. The Court
said, in Hoyt v. Florida,7 that it was rational, and therefore consti-
tutional, for a state to spare women from the obligation to serve on
juries in recognition of women's place at "the center of home and
family life." The Warren Court of the 1 9 60s thus held the base
line set by the Supreme Court in the 1870s,8 at the turn of the cen-
tury,9 and in the 1940s.10 That base line tied tightly into the pre-
vailing "separate-spheres" mentality, or breadwinner-homemaker
dichotomy: It was man's lot, because of his nature, to be breadwin-
ner, head of household, representative of the family outside the
home; and it was woman's lot, because of her nature, not only to
bear, but also to raise children, and keep the home in order.
Against this background, the Supreme Court's position on
gender-based classifications in the 1970s stands out in bold relief.
At odds with its "conservative" reputation, the Burger Court's per-
formance was comparatively unrestrained, one might even say
modestly revolutionary, in this area. Beginning in 1971, the Court
declared law after law, both federal and state, unconstitutional for
discriminating impermissibly on the basis of sex." In 1974, to cite
one of several 1970s examples, a Louisiana jury-selection system
virtually identical to the Florida system unanimously upheld by
the Warren Court in 1961 encountered a different fate: the High
Court declared the system unconstitutional, voting 8-1.12
What happened in the intervening years - the years from
7. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
8. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (rejecting woman's claim of
constitutional right to be admitted to state bar if, apart from her sex, she possesses
necessary qualifications).
9. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding state law restricting hours
women permitted to work).
10. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
11. See Wendy W. Williams, Sex Discrimination: Closing the Law's Gender
Gap, in The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court 1969-1986, at
109, 123 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987) ("In the seventeen years during which Warren Bur-
ger was Chief Justice, equal protection doctrine in sex discrimination cases under-
went a modest revolution."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, T"he Burger Court's Grapplings
with Sex Discrimination, in The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That
Wasn't 132 (Vincent Blasi ed. 1983). See also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The Burger
Court, 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 6 (1987) (while Warren Court "seemed almost un-
interested in sex discrimination," Burger Court "repeatedly has removed barriers
to equality among the sexes").
The principal proscription invoked by the Court is the constraint expressed in
the fourteenth amendment inhibiting government from "deny[ing] to any person
... the equal protection of the laws." The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment applies by its terms only to actions by states. However, the Supreme
Court has declared an equality guarantee of the same quality implicit in the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, which controls actions by the federal gov-
ernment. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
12. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
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1961 to 1971 - that might explain this remarkable switch in the
direction of the Supreme Court's judgments? Nothing new was
added to the text of the Constitution. An equal rights amendment
was proposed by Congress early in the 1970s,13 but eventually
failed to gain ratification by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
states.
The change in the Justices' responses, I believe, reflected
more than anything else a growing comprehension by jurists of a
pervasive change in society at large. Rapid growth in women's em-
ployment outside the home, attended and stimulated by a revived
feminist movement; changing patterns of marriage and reproduc-
tion; longer lifespans; even inflation - all were implicated in a so-
cial dynamic that yielded this new reality: in the 1970s, for the first
time in our nation's history, the "average" woman in the United
States was experiencing most of her adult years in a household not
dominated by childcare requirements. Columbia economics profes-
sor Eli Ginzberg has called this development "the single most out-
standing phenomenon" of the era in which we are living.14
Why did the Warren Court fail to foresee that development,
and why did the Burger Court grasp it? In part the Court stood
pat in the 1961 Hoyt case because the Justices were unable to view
the differential treatment of men and women in the jury-selection
context as in any sense burdensome to women. To turn in a new
direction, the Court first had to comprehend that legislation appar-
ently designed to benefit or protect women could often, perversely,
have the opposite effect.
This was of critical importance, for most laws that drew an
explicit line between men and women did so ostensibly to shield or
favor the sex regarded as fairer but weaker, and dependent-prone.
Laws prescribing the maximum number of hours or time of day
women could work, or the minimum wages they could receive;
laws barring females from "hazardous" or" inappropriate" occupa-
tions (lawyering in the nineteenth century, bartending in the
twentieth); remnants of the common-law regime which denied to
married women rights to hold and manage property, to sue or be
sued in their own names, or to get credit from financial institu-
(1979) (holding unconstitutional state statute allowing "any woman" to opt out of
jury duty).
13. On March 22, 1972, the Senate passed the amendment, thus completing con-
gressional approval of the measure that had passed the House of Representatives in
1971. Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
117 Cong. Rec. 271-72 (1971); S.J. Res. 9, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 272
(1971); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 526 (1971).
14. Quoted in Jean A. Briggs, How You Going to Get 'Em Back in the Kitchen?
(You Aren't), Forbes, Nov. 15, 1977, at 177.
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tions (thus protecting them from their own folly or misjudgment)
- all these prescriptions and proscriptions were premised on the
base line assumption or belief that women could not fend for
themselves; they needed a big brother's assistance. 15 Until the
Supreme Court perceived that women were unfairly constrained
by laws of this kind - laws of the bread-winning male/homemak-
ing female mold - the Justices could not be expected to grapple
with the formulation of constitutional doctrine capable of cur-
tailing that injustice.
In retrospect, it is not difficult to discern the burdensome na-
ture of legislation that confined women to a separate sphere. By
enshrining and promoting the woman's "natural" role as home-
maker, and correspondingly emphasizing the man's role as pro-
vider, the state impeded both men and women from pursuit of the
very opportunities that would have enabled them to break away
from familiar stereotypes. Thus, for example, excluding otherwise
qualified men from attending a nursing school tends, as the
Supreme Court held in 1982,16 to "perpetuate the stereotyped view
of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."17 Instead of advancing
women's welfare, this occupational reservation worked to assure
lower wages in the nursing profession. Similarly, providing social
security spousal (derivative) benefits to wives and widows auto-
matically, but to husbands and widowers only on actual proof of
"dependency,"1s diminishes the worth of a woman's gainful em-
ployment, and can reinforce other disincentives to her work
outside the family's home.
The changes in women's work and days, visible throughout
society by the 1970s, eventually exposed to noticing judges the self-
fulfilling potential of legislation once accepted as benign. Altera-
tion and expansion of women's pursuits insistently called into
question the once largely unchallenged assumption of women's
"natural" dependence on men, and their lack of fitness for men's
occupations. As women in ever-increasing numbers began to pur-
sue economic opportunities outside the home, it became even
harder to sustain the notion that their roles as wife and mother
needed a panoply of special, sex-specific confining guards lest the
very fabric of society disintegrate. And once the protective labels
were stripped away from traditional legal restrictions and classifi-
cations governing women, the pervasive discriminatory effects of
15. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1, 2-7 (1975).
16. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
17. Id. at 729.
18. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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those gross rankings stood out more clearly; most laws governing
women only (or men only) could now be seen by people in the
mainstream as hindering, not preserving, achievement of a genu-
inely natural division or sharing of labor between the sexes.
In 1976, following a series of path-marking cases, 19 the
Supreme Court acknowledged that it had begun - and would con-
tinue - to scrutinize sex lines in the law carefully. The Court
would not sustain differential treatment of men and women that
was merely rationally related to some permissible government ob-
jective; the Court would instead strike out any gender classifica-
tion absent a substantial relationship to an important objective. 20
The word changes in the Supreme Court's formulation of
doctrine - from "rational" to "substantial," and from "permissi-
ble" to "important" - may seem trivial, the kind of fine distinc-
tion only a lawyer could love. But judicial application of a closer
look test in gender-based classification cases has real significance.
With an eye on the clock, I will illustrate the point by describing
only one of the key cases in the evolution of the Supreme Court's
current approach.
When Paula Polatschek died in childbirth in 1972, her hus-
band, Stephen Wiesenfeld, applied for Social Security benefits for
himself and their infant son. He discovered that the Social Secur-
ity Act awarded so called child-in-care benefits only to mothers,
not to fathers. Stephen Wiesenfeld challenged this gender-based
distinction, and ultimately won a unanimous judgment in the
Supreme Court.21 In defense of the sex line, the government had
argued, first, that the distinction between widowed-mothers and
widowed-fathers was entirely rational - that, in fact, widows, as a
class, were more in need of financial assistance than were widow-
ers. True in general, the Court replied, but defenses of sex stere-
otyping in laws as accurately reflecting the situation of the average
woman or the average man were no longer good enough. The
Court looked more closely at a United States society changing
from old ways to new. That society included many widows who
19. The turning point case was Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in which Chief
Justice Burger wrote a brief opinion for a unanimous Court holding that it was un-
constitutional for a state to accord men an automatic preference over women for
estate administration purposes. Next, the Court held 8-1 in Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), that it was unconstitutional to deny to female military of-
ficers housing and medical benefits covering their husbands on the same automatic
basis as those family benefits were accorded to male military officers for their
wives.
20. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See also Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
21. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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had not been dependent on their husbands' earnings, and a still
small but growing number of fathers like Stephen Wiesenfeld pre-
pared to care personally for their children. Using sex as a conve-
nient shorthand to substitute for financial need or willingness to
bring up a baby, while not irrational, failed to survive the Court's
more exacting mode of review.
The government sounded another theme in the Wiesenfeld
case, however, one with a modern ring. The challenged distinc-
tion, it claimed, was not an instance of "romantic paternalism," the
sort of "favor" that in fact operated to keep women in their place;
on the contrary, the government urged, the mother's benefit could
be viewed as a kind of affirmative action - it served to compen-
sate women for the economic discrimination they still routinely
encountered. This claim too withered under careful inspection. As
Justice Stevens, concurring in a follow-up Social Security case,22
remarked: "Congress simply assumed that all widows should be re-
garded as 'dependents' in some general sense .... Habit, rather
than analysis or actual reflection, made it seem acceptable to
equate the terms 'widow' and 'dependent surviving spouse.' "23
This old "habit" or traditional way of thinking about women, the
Supreme Court has indicated, is no longer acceptable to explain
or excuse a gender-based legal classification attacked as
unconstitutional.
The High Court in Wiesenfeld and a number of cases there-
after took a genuinely intermediate position. It did not utterly
condemn the legislature's product. In essence, the Court in-
structed Congress and state legislatures: Rethink and reanalyze
your position on these questions. Should you determine that com-
pensatory legislation is in fact warranted because of the persis-
tence of economic discrimination against women, we have left you
a corridor in which to move. But your classifications must be re-
fined, tied to an income test, for example, and not grossly drawn
solely by reference to sex. The ball, one might say, was tossed
gently back into the legislators' court where the political forces at
work as a result of the new social dynamic could operate. The
Supreme Court wrote moderately. It imposed no specific philoso-
phy on the public, but by forcing legislative reexamination of the
question, it helped ensure that the sometimes glacial pace of legal
change would be speeded up.
The framework evolving at the time of the Wiesenfeld case
persists to this day. It has enabled the Supreme Court effectively
22. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
23. Id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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to break the hold of the breadwinner-homemaker dichotomy by
impelling equalization of the treatment of men and women with
regard to estate administration, 24 military pay and allowances,25
social insurance and welfare benefits,26 workers' compensation,
27
the right to spousal support after divorce, 28 the right to parental
support 29 - even the right to purchase alcoholic beverages.30
Some dramatic descriptions of the role the Supreme Court
plays in the process of social change feature two extreme models.
In one model, the Court aggressively seizes the lead rein of social
progress, as some believe the Court did when it mandated the de-
segregation of public school systems beginning with the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education 31 in 1954. At the opposite extreme,
the Court in the early part of the twentieth century found - or
thrust - itself into the vanguard of resistance to change, striking
down as unconstitutional laws embodying a new philosophy of eco-
nomic regulation at odds with the nineteenth century's laissez-
faire approach.32 During both periods, the Supreme Court was the
object of intense public outcries in certain quarters and its precari-
ous position in our constitutional system was exposed.
In the gender-equality area, the Court's performance fit
neither of these descriptions. For the most part, the Court was
neither out in front of, nor did it hold back, social change. Instead,
what occurred was what engineers might call a "positive feedback"
process, with the Court functioning as an amplifier - sensitively
responding to, and perhaps moderately accelerating, the pace of
change, change toward shared participation by members of both
sexes in our nation's economic and social life.
I do not want to leave you with the impression that the judi-
ciary has proceeded automaton-like - securely on course without
missteps, detours, inconsistencies, and the like. Occasional fog is
24. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
25. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (aid to families with depen-
dent children).
27. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
28. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). See also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455
(1981) (holding unconstitutional Louisiana's former "head and master" rule under
which husband had unilateral right to dispose of jointly-owned property without
his wife's consent).
29. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
30. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (boys must be permitted to buy 3.2 per-
cent beer at the same age as girls).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state maximum hours
regulation for bakery employees, covering men and women alike, held
unconstitutional).
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inevitable in this domain. Registration for the military draft33 and
statutory rape,34 to take two 1980s examples, proved perplexing for
the Justices. 35 And no bold line waiting to be revealed divides jus-
tifiable and genuinely helpful "affirmative action" 36 from action
that reinforces the harmful notion that women need a boost or
preference, because they cannot make it on their own.37 A court
too sure of itself on these matters may, in its zeal, take a giant
stride, only to find itself perilously positioned on an unstable doc-
trinal limb.
A prime portion of the history of the Constitution, historian
Richard Morris has said,38 is the story of the ways constitutional
rights and protections came to be extended to once ignored or ex-
cluded groups. The gender-equality line of cases commencing in
the 1970s compose a vital chapter in that story. The chapter, as I
read it, illustrates the kind of interplay among the people, the
political branches, and the courts that has kept the "more perfect
Union" ordained by the Constitution alive and vibrant over these
last 200 years.
33. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding as constitutional military
draft registration limited to males).
34. Michael M. v. Sonoma Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding state
statutory rape law penalizing males but not females).
35. The Court has also wavered in dealing with claims of unwed fathers to full
parental status, see Williams, supra note 11, at 120-21, and with classifications based
explicitly on pregnancy. Id. at 115.
36. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987)
(upholding as moderate and flexible a plan to effect a gradual increase in represen-
tation of minorities and women in skilled craft worker job classifications).
37. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding state property tax advan-
tage reserved for widows); Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. County
of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding provisions of ordinance
that 1) reserved 2 percent of city's purchasing dollars for women-owned businesses,
and 2) granted such businesses a 5 percent bidding preference).
38. Morris, supra note 1, at 41.

